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YANGGE DANCE: THE RHYTHM OF LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ZHU WANG & KEN OLIPHANT*
INTRODUCTION
Yangge Dance is a popular folk dance in rural China. Its basic pattern
is three paces forwards, followed by two paces back; then a step to the
right, followed by a step to the left. In our view, Yangge Dance is an apt
simile for the process of legal development relating to liability for medical
malpractice in the People's Republic of China (P. R. China).' The three
paces forward refer to successive reforms furthering the interests of pa-
tients, following an initial period-dating from the foundation of P.R. Chi-
na in 1949 until 1987-during which medical malpractice was handled by
an administrative system without formal liability rules. The first of these
advances came in 1987, when the existing administrative system was for-
malized by an administrative regulation, 2 the Rules on the Handling of
Medical Accidents, 3 which provided not only for administrative sanctions
* Zhu Wang, LLD., Associate Professor of Law, Law School of Sichuan University, Deputy
Director of Institute for Chinese Tort Law of Research Center for Civil and Commercial Jurispru-
dence of Renmin University of China (mailtozhuwang@gmail.com). Ken Oliphant is Director of the
Institute for European Tort Law, Vienna, Austria, Professor of Tort Law, University of Bristol,
England, and Honorary Professor, Yantai University, Shandong Province, China. Zhu Wang's
research is supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the
Research Funds of Renmin University of China.
In this article, Chinese names are rendered with the given name preceding the family name
except in Chinese-language citations, where the order is reversed. Unless otherwise indicated, all
translations are by Zhu Wang, and were revised with the assistance of Ken Oliphant.
1. The account presented below relies primarily on Chinese-language materials. For discus-
sion of compensation for medical injuries in P.R. China in English, see Chunyan Ding, Medical
Negligence Law in Transitional China: A patient in need of a cure (July 2009) (unpublished PhD
thesis, University of Hong Kong) (on file with the authors); Liming Liu, Medical Professional
Liability in the Chinese Tort Law Reform Act 2010, 26 PN 224 (2010); Chao Xi & Lixin Yang,
Medical Liability Laws in China: The Tale of Two Regimes, 19 Tort L. Rev. 65 (2011).
2. Administrative regulations issued by the State Council have effect as legislation under
the Legislation Law of 2000. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo Ii fa fa [Legislation Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000,
effective Sept. 1, 2000), available at gov.cn (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). They are subordinate to the
legislation enacted by the National People's Congress (NPC), the supreme legislative organ of P.R.
China, and by its Standing Committee, but have priority over departmental rules issued by central
government ministries and agencies, and over local regulations issued by provincial and munici-
pal people's congresses and their standing committees.
3. Rules on the Handling of Medical Accidents, (promulgated by the State Council, June 29,
1987) [hereinafter Medical Accident Rules 1987].
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in the event of malpractice but also for a (limited) liability to pay compen-
sation for resultant injury. A further advance came in 2002 with the
amendment of this system of administrative liability by the Regulations on
the Handling of Medical Accidents. 4 The third and final advance, consoli-
dated by rulings of the Supreme People's Court (SPC) 5 in 2002-2003, was
to recognize that liability could be established-independently of the ad-
ministrative system-under the ordinary rules of tort6 liability, then embod-
ied in the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of
China (GPCL). 7 Conversely, the enactment of the new Tort Liability Law
(TLL) in 2009, taking effect on July 1, 2010, arguably marks a step back-
wards, subordinating the interests of patients in favor of the interests of the
medical community. A second backwards step, through the prospective
enactment of additional rules relating to liability for medical malpractice
4. Dui chuli yiliao shigu de guiding [Regulations on Handling Medical Accidents] (promul-
gated by the St. Council, Apr. 4, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002), available at gov.cn (last visited Oct.
23, 2011) [hereinafter Medical Accident Regulations 2002].
5. The SPC is P.R. China's highest court. In addition to its role as P.R. China's final court of
appeal, the SPC also has the power to issue quasi-legislative "judicial interpretations" on specific
issues concerning the application of law in the adjudicative work of the people's courts. Depend-
ing on the circumstances, judicial interpretations are issued as an "interpretation," "provision,"
"reply," or "decision." See Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu si fa jie shi gong zuo de gui ding [Provi-
sions of the Supreme People's Court on its Work Relating to judicial Interpretations] art. 6
(promulgated Mar. 23, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.eastlaw.net/chineselaws/judicial/Judiciallnterpretation2007.htm (last visited Oct.
26, 2011). Such rulings have played a vital role in the area of compensation for medical injuries
(and indeed in compensation for personal injury generally). See infra Part Ill.
P.R. China's lower courts include people's courts at various local levels: basic people's courts,
intermediate people's courts, and higher people's courts. See. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo ren
min fa yuan zu zhi fa [Organization Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China]
(adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong., Jul. 1, 1979, revised Sept. 2, 1983, Dec. 2, 1986, and Oct. 31,
2006), available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-
02/12/content_21907420.htm (last visited Oct 26, 2011).
6. An aggrieved party is entitled to proceed in tort even where the conduct complained of is
both a tort and a breach of contract Zhong hua ren min gong he guo he tong fa [Contract Law of
the People's Republic of China] art 122 (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1999), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=97 (last visited Oct
24, 2011). In practice, claims for medical injuries under general civil law are normally brought on
the basis of tort rather than contractual liability.
7. Xing tian ren zhong hua ren min gong he guo de min shi fa lu de yi ban yuan ze [General
Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong.,
Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) [hereinafter
GPCL]. The GPCL was the first legislation in P.R. China to deal comprehensively with general civil
law, including the law of tort (which was addressed in Section 3 of Chapter 6). For an English
translation, see Whitmore Grey & Henry Ruiheng Zheng, General Principles of Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 715 (1986). For analysis in English of its tort law
provisions, see Lin Ye, The Tort System in China, 52 L. & Contemp. Probs. 143 (Xiaoming Li &
Henry Pitney, trans. 1989); Kui-Hua Wang & Danuta Mendelson, An Overview of Liability and
Compensation for Personal Injury in China under the General Principles of Civil Law, 4 Torts L. J.
137 (1996) (Austl.).
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that further advantage healthcare providers, may also be anticipated in the
future.
The sideways steps of Yangge Dance-first to the right, then to the
left-may be taken to refer to the constant interplay (at least since 1992)
between the two concurrent systems of liability for medical malpractice-
one administrative, broadly favoring the interests of the medical communi-
ty, and the other tortious, broadly favoring the interests of patients.
To compare the two liability regimes (administrative and tortious),
and to show their development over time, the analysis below addresses four
common dimensions of the parallel systems, namely, the basis of the cause
of action, the burden of proof, the process of (technical or judicial) "identi-
fication" 8 used to establish that a compensable medical injury has been
suffered, and the assessment of damages.
I. THE WIDER HEALTHCARE CONTEXT9
P.R. China was founded in 1949. In the early years of the Communist
regime, healthcare-and social welfare provision in general-was orga-
nized on a commune or workplace basis, with free basic healthcare for all.
All medical facilities were publicly owned and operated; doctors were em-
ployees of the State; there was no private medicine. The system achieved
significant success against a range of health indicators (e.g., life expectan-
cy, infant mortality), with its performance matching or exceeding that of
many countries with superior economic resources.10
With the reform and opening-up policy adopted in 1978,1 the com-
mune system was dismantled as private enterprise was encouraged. Many
state-owned enterprises closed. The social safety net the communes and
public-sector employment provided was abruptly swept away. The propor-
tion of the population covered by health insurance declined sharply.
Though some doctors (especially doctors in rural areas and practitioners of
traditional Chinese medicine) began to practice privately, most healthcare
8. Also translated as "authentication" by some authors. See, e.g., Ding, supra note 1, passim;
Xi & Yang, supra note 1, passim.
9. For general accounts in English, see David Blumenthal & William Hsiao, Privatization and
Its Discontents-The Evolving Chinese Health Care System, 353 New Eng. J. Med. 1165 (2005);
Sarah L Barber & Lan Yao, Health Insurance Systems in China: A briefing note, World Health
Report (2010), Background Paper No. 37 (2010), available at
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/37ChinaBYFINAL.pdf (last
visited Oct 3, 2011); R.E. Ling et al., Emerging Issues in Public Health: A Perspective on China's
Healthcare System, 125 Pub. Health 9 (2011).
10. Blumenthal & Hsiao, supra note 9, at 1166.
11. On the reform and opening-up, and in particular their impact on the role of law in P.R.
China, see Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China After Mao ch. 5 (1999).
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facilities remained under state ownership. But user fees were introduced
even for public healthcare and providers were generally encouraged to
operate as businesses.12 Substantial disparities arose in the quality of care
provided, reflecting widely divergent levels of investment. The resultant
problems were particularly acute in rural areas. 13
Since 1997, China has striven to address inequalities in healthcare
provision with successive reform programs supported by significant in-
vestment. 14 The voluntary medical insurance schemes previously applying
to urban workers and rural residents have been replaced, and contributions
are now subsidized to a significant degree by central and local government.
A medical assistance program (Medicare) has been introduced for the poor.
A network of community health centers, dependent on State financing ra-
ther than user fees, has been created. Efforts have been made to address
skill shortages-in particular, in remote areas and in primary care-
through education and training. New initiatives have sought to secure the
maintenance of appropriate quality standards, with an emphasis on better
record keeping and the reporting of adverse events15 to supplement the
traditional forms of government oversight (licensing and accreditation of
practitioners and facilities, approval of drugs, etc.). The "Health China"
initiative adopted in 2009 aspires to universal basic healthcare coverage by
12. Qingyue Meng and Shenglan Tang, Universal Coverage of Health Care in China: Challeng-
es and Opportunities, World Health Report (2010), Background Paper No. 7 para. 3.2 (2010),
available at http://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/7ChinaM-T.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
13. See Adam Wagstaff et al., The Int'l Bank for Reconstruction & Dev./The World Bank,
Reforming China's Rural Health System (2009), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-
1248160372290/rural health-full report en.pdf (last visited Oct 3, 2011).
14. For general accounts in English, see Shenglan Tang et al., Tackling the Challenges to
Health Equity in China, 372 Lancet 1493 (2008); Shanlian Hu et al., Reform of How Health Care is
Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities, 372 Lancet 1846 (2008).
15. The Medical Accident Regulations 2002 impose a reporting obligation on medical work-
ers who, in the course of their medical activities, cause or discover a medical accident, or medical
fault that might result in a medical accident; such reports are investigated internally and entail an
obligation to inform and provide an appropriate explanation to the patient concerned. Yi liao shi
gu chu Ii tiao Ii [Regulations on Handling Medical Accidents] art. 13 (promulgated by the St. Coun-
cil, Feb. 20, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002), available at http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-
07/25/content_16885.htm (last visited Oct 25, 2011). Where a medical accident actually occurs,
the medical institution is also obliged to report it to the health administration. Id. at art. 14. By
Article 10, item 9 of the Government Information Publicity Regulations, the government has an
obligation to make such information available to the public. Zheng fu xin xi gong kai tiao Ii [Regu-
lation on Open Government Information] (promulgated by the St Council, Apr. 24, 2007, effective
May 1, 2008), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/IntellectualLife/ChOGI-Regualtions-Eng-Final_0516
07.pdf (last visited Oct 25, 2011).
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2020.16 Problems remain, however. China's health system performs une-
venly, doing well on some indicators and poorly on others.17 Three under-
lying problems in particular have proved hard to solve, notwithstanding the
increased investment: (1) high levels of out-of-pocket expenditure on med-
icines and medical services, including a high proportion of catastrophic
expenditure (i.e., more than 30 percent of income), with potentially devas-
tating effects on those affected;' 8 (2) a geographical imbalance in
healthcare spending, with greater expenditure on urban as compared with
rural areas; and (3) the commercialization of healthcare without adequate
attention to cost control, which has led to escalation of prices and decreased
efficiency. 19
According to World Health Organization statistics, China's total ex-
penditure on health as a percentage of gross domestic product was 4.3% in
2007 (as compared with a global average of 9.7%, and 15.7% and 8.8% for
the United States and European Region respectively).20 Of the total, 44.7%
was general government expenditure and 55.3% private expenditure. Gen-
eral government expenditure on health was 9.9% of total government ex-
penditure. 21 Reflecting the high levels of direct (out-of-pocket) payment for
medicines and medical services, noted above, only 7.1% of private ex-
penditure on health was on private prepaid plans. 22 Per capita total ex-
penditure on health was equivalent to just USD $ 43, far below not just
Europe and the United States (USD $ 2,035 and USD $ 7,285 respectively)
but also the global average of USD $ 802. Just to give these figures is to
16. Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council, Opinions of the CPC
Central Committee and State Council on Deepening the Health Care System Reform (Mar. 17,
2009), available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/scio-press-conferences/2009-
04/09/content 17575378.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
17. Yuanli Liu et al., China's Health System Performance, 372 Lancet 1914 (2008).
18. As exemplified by the "Harbin scandal" of 2005, in which the family of an elderly patient
hospitalized in an intensive care unit for over two months were required to pay in excess of RMB
6 million (approx. US$ 660,000). See Edwin C. Hui, The Contemporary Healthcare Crisis in China
and the Role of Medical Professionalism, 35 J. Med. Philos. 477,479-80 (2010).
19. Ling et al., supra note 9.
20. World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2010 127-39 tbl. 7 (2010), available
at http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/ENWHS1O-Full.pdf.
21. Id. at 130. Global average: 15.4%; United States: 19.5%; Europe Region: 15.3%. Id. at
136,138.
22. Id. at 131. Global average: 45.0%; United States: 63.5%; Europe Region: 24.3%. Id. at
137, 139. In considering the interaction between health insurance and the liability system, it is
material to note that an insurer who pays insurance moneys to an injured insured has no right to
recover those sums from the third party who caused the injury, though the latter's liability to the
insured is unaffected. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo bao xian fa [Insurance Law of the People's
Republic of China] art. 46 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Jun. 30,
1995, amended Oct. 28, 2002 and Feb. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/DAT/214788.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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make clear the nature of the challenge facing Chinese healthcare in the
coming years.
II. THE EARLY P.R. CHINA: MEDICAL SERVICES AS SOCIAL WELFARE
(1949-1987)
As detailed above, medical services were treated as a matter of social
welfare in the early years of P.R. China after its foundation in 1949. There
was no legislation on liability or compensation for medical malpractice, 23
and disputes were normally settled on an informal basis within the adminis-
trative framework. As early as 1953, the central government investigated
and reported improper acts on the part of medical institutions and person-
nel; these acts included serious accidents that caused death or deterioration
of patients' conditions as a result of negligence on the part of hospitals and
major fault in nursing.24 At that time, judges believed dispute settlement
through mediation served judicial policy better than litigation, and declined
to impose civil liability.25 A Reply by the Supreme People's Court, dated
January 18, 1964, states:
In dealing with medical accidents, the court should not award eco-
nomic compensation, but may seek other types of remedy for patients
who suffer death or disability or loss of income as a result of medical ac-
cidents. Therefore, you may advise the department of public health of
23. All laws dating from before 1949 were repealed on the foundation of P.R. China. Alt-
hough there were periodic attempts thereafter to legislate a civil code, none has yet been success-
ful, though a first concrete step was taken in that direction with the enactment of the GPCL in
1986. See GPCL, supra note 7. The enactment of a Tort Liability Law in 2009, following the Con-
tract Law of 1999 and Property Law of 2007, can be seen as a further step towards a complete
civil code. See Qin quan ze ren fa di zhong guo ren min gong huo guo, [Tort Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 2009,
effective Jul. 1, 2010); Zhong hua ren min gong he guo he tong fa [Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999,
effective October 1, 1999), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=97 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2011); Zhong hua ren min gong he guo wu quan fa [Property Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'I People's Cong., Mar. 13, 2007,
effective Oct. 1, 2007) available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-
2010/2011-02/11/content_21897791.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
24. Zhong Yang Ren Min Zheng Fu Zheng Wu Yuan Guan Yu Zheng Wu Yuan Ren Min Jian Cha
Wei Yuan Hui Guan Yu Chu Li Ruo Gan Yuan Zhong De Yi Liao Shi Gu He Yi Wu Ren Yuan Bu Liang
Zuo Feng An Jian De Tong Bao, Shan Xi Zheng Bao 1954 nian di 10 qi, di 70-72 ye.
((O1@iYt)) 19544M103M, M70-723. ) [A Circular on Dealing with
Medical Accidents in Hospitals and Improper Acts of Medical Personnel by the Supervisory Com-
mission of Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government, 10 Shanxi
Pol. J. 70, 70-72 (1954)].
25. Xie Guisheng (ihvI), Cong Yi Jian Yi Liao Shi Gu An Jian de Chu Li Kan Shen Pan Si
Xiang , Fa Xue 1985 nian di 9 qi ,di 26-28 ye.( ((V-f1 f4 I )
(ih)) 19589J9, M26-28No. ) [A Study on Trial Thoughts Through the Judgment of A
Medical Accident, 9 Legal Sci. 26, 26-28 (1958)].
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your province to seek remedies through joint efforts with labor, person-
nel and civil administration departments, and execute them.26
Few claims of medical malpractice were litigated at this time, and lit-
tle attention was given to compensation for harm caused by medical treat-
ment.
In 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) adopted a policy of reform and opening-up, and China began a
transformation from a planned to a market economy. As Chinese society
underwent a remarkable change, the foundations of the established medical
system began to shake (as detailed above). With the progress of medical
reform, more medical disputes arose, requiring the improvement of relevant
legal mechanisms. But, generally speaking, most workers still enjoyed free
medical services at this time, and medical institutions remained part of the
social welfare system, funded by government, and it seems from the very
few civil cases discussed in the secondary literature at this time (in contrast
with the number of criminal cases discussed there) that few disputes actual-
ly went to court. In practice, the main focus as regards medical malpractice
was on criminal liability, even though the then-effective Criminal Law,
promulgated by the National People's Congress in 1979, did not criminal-
ize medical malpractice as such.27 Doctors were charged with various
crimes of general application, such as negligent killing, negligently causing
a serious accident, or neglect of duty, or sometimes with crimes specifically
relating to medical malpractice (e.g., negligently causing a serious medical
accident or criminal medical fault) without any express basis in the legisla-
tive text.28 Shortly after the enactment of the 1979 Criminal Law, 29 schol-
ars began to suggest that medical malpractice should itself be recognized as
a crime. 30 This controversial issue was finally settled in 1997 when Article
26. Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Chu Li Yi Liao Shi Gu An Jian Bu Ying Pan Gei Jing Ji Bu
Chang Wen Ti De Pi Fu, 1964 nian 1 yue 18 ri.
( (( rKX., a t~ R ~ t XTq VKf_$ WV4T J16J f -7 4 o J ,t V)) (19 64 *1 A 18 H ))
[Reply by the Sup. People's Ct. as to Not Granting Economic Compensation in Medical Accidents
(Sup. People's Ct. 1964)].
27. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Second Session of
the Fifth Nat'l People's Cong, July 1, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Criminal Law].
28. Chan Zhang, (KW?), Yi Liao Shi Gu Xing Shi An Jian Liu Shi Si Li Fa Li Pou Xi, Fa Lv Yu Yi
Xue Za Zhi 1994 nian di 2 qi, di 74 ye.
( (EFt64]$ 6)2JT)), (($4t 1$#)) 1994*M2M, 74 o ) [An
Analysis of 64 Criminal Cases of Medical Accidents, 2 L. & Med. 74 (1994)].
29. 1979 Criminal Law, supra note 27.
30. Wu Shimin, (##±R), Zhong Da Yi Liao Shi Gu Ru He Ding Zui, Xian Dai Fa Xue 1982 nian
di 1 qi, di 30-31 ye.
(, ((1ARKSrllW W?) , ((ftM*) 1982%1Ml, M30-31. )[How to Establish
Criminal Liability for Serious Medical Accidents, 1 Mod. Sci. of L. 30, 30-31 (1982)]; Wang
Xiaojuan & Chen Haibo, (1980fit, igi), Guan Yu Ren Ding Yi Liao Shi Gu Fan Zui de Ji Ge Wen
Ti, Fa Zhi Cong Lun 1992 nian di yi qi, di 42-46 ye.
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335 of the newly amended Criminal Law established a crime of serious
medical malpractice resulting in death or serious harm: "[m]edical person-
nel whose serious failure to carry out their responsibility causes the death
of a patient or serious harm to a patient's health shall be sentenced to not
more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention."31
It should be noted that Chinese law allows a person injured by a crim-
inal act to recover compensation through the criminal courts. Under the
Criminal Procedure Law,32 if a victim has suffered material losses as a
result of the defendant's criminal act, he has the right to file an "incidental
civil action" during the course of the criminal proceeding. 33 The incidental
civil action is generally heard together with the criminal trial, but may be
continued after the criminal trial has ended if necessary to prevent it being
excessively delayed. 34 So far as can be ascertained, however, criminal
prosecutions of doctors are rare.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY REGIME
A national regime of administrative liability for medical accidents was
established by the Medical Accident Rules of 1987,35 and reformed by the
Medical Accident Regulations of 2002. Both enactments were administra-
tive regulations drafted by the Ministry of Health and promulgated by the
central government (State Council), and were applicable to both public and
private healthcare.
A. The Medical Accident Rules 1987
1. Context
The Medical Accident Rules 1987 were enacted when the provision of
free medical services, including medical treatment by a healthcare institu-
( (A iL ff$ [!)A ]J), ((~t)1992*M119, Z42-46),o ) [several
Problems Concerning the Establishment of Medical Accidents, 1 Collection of Papers on Rule of
Law 42, 42-46 (1992)]; Hou Guoyun( {#BI), You Guan Yi Liao Shi Gu Zui de Ji Ge Wen
Ti, Zhong Guo Wei Sheng Fa Zhi 1995 nian di 2 qi, di 7-10
ye. ( ((f~f& #A lai~), (' 92fT100J) 1995*Z21, M7-10To )
[Guoyun Hou, Several Questions on Convictions in Respect of Medical Accidents, 2 Rule of Law in
China's Pub. Health, 7-10 (1995)].
31. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Criminal Law].
32. Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat'l
People's Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 17, 1996).
33. Id. at art. 77 para. 1.
34. Id. at art. 78.
35. The 1987 Rules were preceded by local administrative regulations adopted in Shanghai
and Shanxi Province in 1985. See Ding, supra note 1, at 70-71, 178-80.
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tion, was part of social welfare policy. Most hospitals were still state-
owned at the time. As a result, it was thought desirable to place a strict
limit on the liability of medical institutions that did harm to their patients
when performing medical treatment. The 1987 Rules created a formal sys-
tem of administrative liability in cases of medical accident in which claims
for compensation were submitted in the first instance to the health admin-
istration (for adjudication or mediation), with the option of a new hearing
before a court if either party was unsatisfied with the outcome. 36 In hearing
such a claim, the court would apply the 1987 Rules rather than the ordinary
principles of tortious liability. The enactment of the Rules immediately
after the GPCL strongly suggests that their intention was to exclude the
GPCL's application to medical accidents so as to limit the circumstances
giving rise to liability and the amount of compensation to be paid when
liability was established.
2. Main Features of the Administrative Liability Regime, 1987-2002
a. Basis of the Cause ofAction
Under the Rules, the basic component of the cause of action was a
dispute about compensation for harm caused by a medical accident.37 The
term "medical accident" referred to a situation where the patient suffered
death, disability, or organ damage resulting in dysfunction, as a direct re-
sult of fault in diagnosis, medical treatment, or nursing on the part of medi-
cal personnel. 38 Medical accidents included "malpractice accidents" and
"technical accidents." A medical malpractice accident was an accident
caused by medical personnel due to a breach of duty as a result of the viola-
tion of rules or regulations, or of procedures for diagnosis, cure or nursing.
A technical medical accident was an accident caused by medical personnel
due to negligent treatment not involving the violation of any such rule or
procedure. Accidents involving malpractice were regarded as more serious
than those involving mere negligence in treatment, 39 with administrative
sanctions (e.g., dismissal, demotion or warning) attaching to the responsi-
ble personnel, while such sanctions applied to technical accidents only
where a seriousness threshold was crossed, and even then the sanctions
applied were less severe. 40
36. Rules on the Handling of Medical Accidents art. 11 (promulgated by the St. Council, June
29, 1987) [hereinafter Medical Accidents Rules 1987].
37. As affirmed by the Regulation on Causes of Action for Civil Cases (for Trial Implementa-
tion) (promulgated by the SPC, effective Jan. 1, 2001).
38. Medical Accident Rules 1987, supra note 36, at art. 2.
39. Id. at art. 5.




Under the Rules of 1987, the burden of proof lay on the patient. The
Rules required that, when a medical accident (or an incident which might
later be recognized as a medical accident) occurred, the medical institution
should assign a specific person to properly keep such original materials as
were relevant.41 In reality, however, it was possible for the medical institu-
tion to alter, forge, conceal, or even destroy the original materials. Conse-
quently, it seems to have been difficult for patients-who were further
disadvantaged by their own lack of medical knowledge-to satisfy the
burden of proof lying on them. So they had to apply for "technical identifi-
cation" (see below), which itself tended to favor the hospital.42
c. The Identification Process
A central feature of the administrative liability regime established by
the 1987 Rules was the process of "technical identification." This was the
procedure by which a committee of medical experts, selected by the health
administration (i.e., the responsible provincial, regional or municipal de-
partment of health),43 would investigate the circumstances giving rise to a
claim and report their conclusions to the appropriate tribunal. A decision of
a local committee could be appealed to a higher level (e.g., a provincial
committee) but the outcome of the process was in practice binding on the
tribunal (whether the health administration or a court), except to the extent
that the court could remit the case to be reviewed either by the original
committee or a higher-level committee. Technical identification could be
carried out at the level of the province, city, county or municipal district;44
there was no nationwide organization undertaking the process. Since most
hospitals were still state-owned at the time, technical identification orga-
nized by the local health administration was just a case of (in the common
parlance) "making the father the judge of the son." Hospitals were favored
with the excuse that medical malpractice did not amount to a "medical
accident" but merely a "medical error" giving rise to no liability to pay
compensation.
41. Id.atart.8.
42. Yang Lixin (0AWM), Yi Liao Qin Quan Yu Fa Lv Shi Yong, Fa Lv Chu Ban She 2008 nian
ban, di 4 ye. ( (M47tWfflWJ1 , l 2008*Y, M4 ) [The Law and Its
Application for Medical Torts 4 (2008)].
43. Medical Accident Rules 1987, supra note 36, at art. 11.
44. Id.atart. 12.
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d. Assessment ofDamages
Where an occurrence was identified as a medical accident, the patient
was to be awarded a lump sum payment of compensation according to the
accident's grade of severity on a scale of 1-3 (see below), its circumstances
and the patient's pre-existing condition. The Rules provided that the level
of compensation should be formulated by the provincial, regional or munic-
ipal government in whose area the accident occurred.45 The sums awarded
were small, and reflected the grade of the accident rather than the loss actu-
ally suffered by the patient. As an example, we may consider the levels of
compensation prescribed in Tianjin, a municipality directly under the cen-
tral government near Beijing: 46
Grade I medical accidents (causing death): compensation in the range
of RMB 3,000 to 4,000;47 compensation for infants under the age of three
was RMB 1,000; compensation for neonates was RMB 700.
Grade II medical accidents (causing serious disability or severe dys-
function): RMB 3,000 to 5,000.
Grade III medical accidents (causing disability or dysfunction): RMB
2,000 to 3,000; compensation for infants under the age of three was RMB
700; compensation for neonates was RMB 500.
These compensation levels were actually very low even when they
were introduced (1988), and they did not change in the fourteen years until
the enactment of a new set of Regulations in 2002.
B. The Medical Accident Regulations 200248
1. Context
A new set of administrative regulations replaced the previously enact-
ed rules in 2002, though they maintained the basic features of the previous
regime, at least in broad outline. The Medical Accident Regulations 2002
were intended to respond to widespread criticism of the strict limits on
liability in the previous regime and they may thus be considered to have
made some progress towards the better protection of patients' interests.
45. Id.atart.18.
46. Detailed Rules on the Implementation of the Regulations on Handling Medical Accidents
in Tianjin art. 19 (1988).
47. In 1988, the exchange rate for the US dollar: Chinese Renminbi (or yuan) was USD 1
RMB 3.712. U.S. Dep't Treasury, Fin. Mgmt. Serv.,Treasury Reporting Rates of Exchange (1988-
1991) 3 (1991).
48. For analysis in English, see Dean M. Harris & Chien-Chang Wu, Medical Malpractice in the
People's Republic of China: The 2002 Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents, 33 J. L.
Med. & Ethics 456 (2005).
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However, there was still a big gap between the medical and legal communi-
ty's estimations of the proper extent of liability.
2. Main Features of the Administrative Liability Regime, 2002 onwards
a. Basis of the Cause ofAction
The 2002 Regulations defined "medical accident" as an accident
caused by a medical institution or its medical personnel resulting in person-
al injuries to a patient due to negligence in medical activities as a result of
the violation of laws, administrative regulations or departmental rules on
medical and health administration, or of standards or procedures for diag-
nosis, cure and nursing.49 Compared with the Rules of 1987, the new Regu-
lations expanded the scope of medical accident in two aspects. First, harm
was no longer limited to death, disability or functional dysfunction: any
physical injury caused by negligent medical treatment was covered. Four
grades of accident were now recognized (instead of the previous three):
death and serious disability (Grade I); moderate disability (Grade II); mild
disability (Grade III); and other obvious injury (Grade IV).50 Second, cau-
sality was no longer limited to direct causation: indirect causation was also
included.
b. Burden ofProof
Though the burden of proof was still on the patient, the 2002 Regula-
tions imposed a more onerous recordkeeping obligation on medical institu-
tions, who were to compile and properly preserve medical records as
required by the health administration department of the State Council. In
the case of emergency treatment to save the patient's life, where timely
record keeping might not be possible, the medical person concerned had an
obligation to update the record within six hours of the treatment being giv-
en.51 Alteration, forgery, concealment, destruction, and seizure of medical
records were strictly forbidden, 52 on penalty of administrative or discipli-
nary sanction or, in prescribed circumstances, criminal punishment.53 Pa-
tients were entitled to a copy of their record on request. 54
49. Regulations on Handling of Medical Accidents art. 2 (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr.
4, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Medical Accident Regulations 2002].
50. Id. at art. 4.
51. ld.atart.8.
52. Id. at art. 9.
53. Id. at arts 58-59.
54. Id. at art. 10.
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c. Technical Identification
There were two significant changes as regards the process of technical
identification. 55 First, the responsibility for organizing the process was
shifted from the health administration to the medical associations (i.e., the
professional bodies representing healthcare practitioners). In the 1987
Rules, the technical identification was organized by the health administra-
tion itself, which was also the administrative authority of the hospital that
was being sued, and this created a very obvious conflict of interests. To
address this unsatisfactory situation, the 2002 Regulations required the
health administration department concerned to forward any report of seri-
ous medical fault from a medical institution, and every application to settle
a medical accident dispute from a party to it, to the responsible medical
association for the purposes of organizing the necessary technical identifi-
cation.56
Second, technical identification at a national level became available.
In addition to the technical identifications organized by local medical asso-
ciations, the 2002 Regulations provided for the Chinese Medical Associa-
tion 57 to organize technical identification of difficult and complicated
medical accident disputes having significant national importance. 58
In spite of these major changes, the new system attracted criticism be-
cause the medical associations had such close links with the health admin-
istration. Though formally independent, in reality the medical associations
perform a semi-official role and are closely linked with and dependent
upon government at all levels, with leading positions in them being taken
by leaders of health administration departments. Consequently, the new
identification system was perceived to involve medical institutions "shield-
ing" one another, and still tended to protect hospitals from liability. 59
55. In departmental rules issued shortly after the Medical Accident Regulations 2002, the
aim of technical identification was described as being to reach a conclusion as to the following
issues (amongst others): (1) whether the medical treatment violated a law, administrative regula-
tion or departmental rule or the applicable standards and procedures for diagnosis, cure or nurs-
ing; (2) the causal relationship between the medical fault (if any) and the personal injury; (3) the
extent of responsibility to be attributed to the medical fault for causing injury in the medical
accident; and (4) the grade of severity of the medical accident. See Temporary Rules on Technical
Identification of Medical Accidents (coming into force on Sept. 1, 2002), at item 4-7, para. 1, arts.
35-36.
56. Medical Accident Regulations 2002, supra note 49, at art. 20.
57. See Chinese Med. Ass'n, About the CMA, http://www.cma.org.cn/ensite/.
58. Medical Accident Regulations 2002, supra note 49, at art. 21.
59. See Xi & Yang, supra note 1, at 70-71 (citing evidence from a number of local surveys to
report that the percentage of medical accident claims upheld by identification panels under the




In contrast with the 1987 Rules, which left the amount of compensa-
tion payable for each grade of medical accident to be determined by pro-
vincial, regional or municipal administrative rules, the 2002 Regulations
treated the loss suffered by the patient-rather than the grade of the acci-
dent-as decisive, and stipulated in some detail the heads of loss in respect
of which compensation would be awarded. Eleven items were listed: (1)
medical expenses; (2) loss of income (subject to a cap of three times annual
earnings in the place the medical accident occurred); (3) a food allowance
during hospitalization; (4) expenses incurred looking after the patient; (5) a
living allowance in the event of disability; (6) a disability allowance for the
purchase of appliances; (7) funeral expenses; (8) the living expenses of a
dependent; (9) a traffic allowance; (10) a lodging allowance; and (11) a
solatium for emotional harm, capped by reference to annual living expenses
in the place of the accident. 60 Conspicuous because of its absence from this
list is compensation for death itself, in contrast with the ordinary rules of
tortious liability where such compensation is expressly allowed (in addition
to compensation for the living expenses of dependents and a solatium for
emotional harm resulting from the bereavement). 61 This is the principal
reason why the legal community has taken comprehensive measures to
sideline the Medical Accident Regulations 2002 when proceedings are
brought in court.
A significant feature of the administrative liability scheme as amended
in 2002 was the requirement to apportion liability to reflect not only the
grade of the accident but also both the extent of responsibility to be at-
tributed to the medical fault and the role played by the patient's underlying
condition. 62 For example, where a fifty-one-year-old man was treated in
hospital for an abdominal injury and died, the main cause of death being
the hospital's medical mistakes, and a contributing cause being the man's
previous liver problems, this constituted a Grade I medical accident where
the hospital had to bear the main responsibility, but, taking account of the
60. Medical Accident Regulations 2002, supra note 49, at art. 50. The solatium for emotional
harm is calculated by reference to annual average living expenses in the place where the medical
accident occurs. In the case of death, a maximum of six times the annual amount may be paid; in
the case of non-fatal disability, the maximum is three times the annual amount. See id. at art.
50(11).
61. See infra Part V(IV).B.4.
62. Medical Accident Regulations 2002, supra note 49, at art. 49.
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patient's pre-surgery medical conditions, the defendant's liability was de-
termined to be only 80 percent. 63
IV. THE TORT LIABILITY REGIME
A. Recourse to the General Principles of Civil Liability
Responding to dissatisfaction about the low levels of compensation
paid under the administrative liability regime (at that time governed by the
Rules of 1987), the SPC began unobtrusively to allow injured patients ac-
cess to higher compensation awards by recognizing their ability to bring
their claim on the basis of tortious liability arising under the GPCL; if suc-
cessful, the compensation would be calculated under the more generous
damages rules of the GPCL rather than those of the administrative liability
regime. In a formal Reply to the High Court of Tianjin in 1992, the SPC
stated that the local court could properly handle medical accident cases in
accordance with either the relevant provisions of the GPCL, or the State
Council's Medical Accident Regulations (combined with the local rules
implementing the Regulations), according to the specific conditions of the
case.64 The SPC's Reply thus allowed the court in Tianjin to make a com-
pensatory award under the GPCL that was much higher than would have
been possible under the administrative liability regime. Even though the
medical community insisted that the GPCL should not be applied so indis-
criminatingly that it came to replace the administrative regime,65 the courts
began to show a preference for the GPCL from this time on. This move
towards tort liability was consolidated in 2003-just one year after the
administrative liability regime was reformed-when the SPC issued a No-
tice on the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Medical Disputes with Reference
to the Medical Accident Regulations, which explicitly established a dual
63. [Yang v Unnamed County Hospital] (People's Court of Sheyang County, Jiangsu Province
May 19 2006). The authors are very grateful to Benjamin Liebman for pointing them towards this
decision and providing them an English translation.
64. Zui Gao Ren MinFa Yuan Guan Yu Li Xinrong Su Tian Jin shi di'er Yi Xue Yuan Fu Shu Yi
Yuan Yi Liao Shi Gu Pei Chang Yi An Ru He Shi Yong Fa Iv Wen Ti de Fu Han, 1992 nian 3 yue 24
ri.
J0)) (1992 T3 A 24 l) ] [Reply of Supreme People's Court to the Question of How to
Apply Laws of the Medical Accident Compensation Case "Li Xinrong vs. Tianjin Second Medical
College Subsidiary Hospital" (Mar. 24, 1992)].
65. Hu Xiaoxiang(M ri), Zai Lun Dui "Yi Liao Shi Gu Chu Li Ban Fa" de Ping Jia-Bu Ke Lan
Yong "Min Pa Tong Ze", Zhong Guo Wei Sheng Shi Ye Guan Li 1998 nian di 7 qi, di 364-367 ye. (
M7(M, M364-367W. ) [Xiaoxiang Hu, Reevaluation of Medical Accident Rules 1987-GPCL
Should Not Be Applied Indiscriminatingly, 7 Admin. of Pub. Health China, 364-367 (1998)].
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system of liability for medical malpractice. 66 The relationship of the two
liability regimes to each other, and the differences between them, may now
be considered with reference to the four criteria proposed above: the cause
of action, the burden of proof, the identification process, and the assess-
ment of damages.
B. Elements of the Tort Liability Regime
1. Cause of Action
The SPC Notice provided that, where a lawsuit is brought before any
court67 regarding a dispute over compensation for medical malpractice
which occurred after the 2002 Regulations came into force, it is to be re-
solved by referring to the relevant provisions in the Regulations; for dis-
putes over compensation for patient injury attributed to factors other than
medical malpractice, the provisions of the GPCL apply.68 Thus, if a patient
sued the hospital on the basis of a medical accident, the court would decide
the case under the administrative liability regime. If the patient chose to sue
the hospital on the basis of fault sufficient to establish ordinary civil liabil-
ity (commonly termed "medical fault," though the GPCL laid down no
special rule for fault in a medical context), the court would decide the case
according to the GPCL and, most importantly, would calculate the damages
according to the SPC Interpretation dealing with compensation for personal
injury in civil cases.69 We consider below the huge difference this made to
the quantum of compensation. In practice, the courts allowed patients the
freedom to sue hospitals on the basis of medical fault rather than medical
accident, and most patients chose to proceed on this basis in view of the
advantages of the tort liability regime.
66. Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan "Guan Yu Can Zhao 'Yi Liao Shi Gu Chu Li Tiao Li' Shen Li Yi Liao
Jiu Fen Min Shi An Jian de Tong Zhi,", 2003 nian 1 yue 6 ri, fa [2003] 20 hao.
R, M-[2003]2049) [Notice of the Supreme People's Court on "The Trial of Civil Cases Involving
Medical Disputes with Reference to the 'Medical Accident Regulations"'] Jan. 6, 2003 [hereinafter
SPC Notice on the Medical Accident Regulations].
67. Cases for medical malpractice are usually brought in a basic people's court or intermedi-
ate people's court.
68. SPC Notice on the Medical Accident Regulations, supra note 66, § I para. 1.
69. "Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Shen Li Ren Shen Sun Hai Pei Chang An Jian Shi Yong
Fa Iv Ruo Gan Wen Ti de lie Shi," 2003 nian 12 yue 4 ri You Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Shen Pan
Wei Yuan Hui di 1299 ci Hui Yi Tong Guo, Zi 2004 nian 5 yue 1 ri Shi Xing.((} i~I* f ~ I~1~ ~ 2003*12A 4H h
i r12004950ql $g o. ) ["Interpretation of the
Supreme People's Court of Some Issues Concerning the Application of the Law on the Trial of
Cases to Compensation for Personal Injury," adopted at the 1,299th meeting of the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Supreme People's Court on Dec. 4, 2003, coming into force on May 1, 2004] Dec. 26,
2003 [hereinafter SPC Interpretation on Compensation for Personal Injury].
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2. Burden of Proof
Though the burden of proof in civil litigation normally lies on the
plaintiff, in 2002 a Judicial Interpretation of the SPC introduced a reversal
in the burden of proving causation and fault in claims alleging medical
fault.70 This was a crucial feature of the tort liability regime applying to
medical injuries as developed at this time by the courts in parallel to the
administrative liability regime. The relevant passage stipulates: "In tort
actions relating to medical practice, medical institutions shall bear the bur-
den of proving both the lack of a causal relationship between the medical
practice and the harmful consequences, and the absence of medical fault."71
In short, causation and fault were presumed and had to be disproved by the
hospital. This contrasted with the administrative liability regime where the
burden of proof was always on the plaintiff.
3. The Identification Process
The SPC also decided that a dual system should apply to the process
of identification, depending on whether administrative or tortious liability
was at stake. 72 If, in civil proceedings pursued on the basis of medical acci-
dent, the court decided-upon application by either party concerned or in
the exercise of its own powers-that there should be a technical identifica-
tion, this would be conducted by a medical association prescribed by regu-
lation. However, where an identification procedure was required in a
dispute over compensation for patient injury not attributed to a medical
accident (i.e., in an action brought under the tort liability regime), a "judi-
cial identification" would be organized by the court itself, rather than by
the health administration (as under the 1987 Rules) or a medical association
(as under the 2002 Regulations). 73 This was important because, under the
70. "Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Min Shi Su Song Zheng Ju de Ruo Gan Gui Ding," 2001
nian 12 yue 6 ri You Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Shen Pan Wei Yuan Hui di 1201 ci Hui Yi Tong Guo,
Zi 2002 nian 4 yue 1 ri qi Shi Xing.
M1201&-i& jli, 2002$40 1 fI Eff) ["Several Stipulations of the Supreme People's
Court on Evidence in Civil Actions," adopted on Dec. 6, 2011 at the 1,201st meeting of the Judicial
Committee of the Supreme People's Court, effective Apr. 1, 2002] Dec. 21, 2001, at art. 4(8).
71. Id.
72. SPC Notice on the Medical Accident Regulations, supra note 66, § 11 para. 1.
73. Ren Min Fa Yuan Dui Wai Wei Tuo Si Fa Jian Ding Guan Li Gui Ding, 2002 nian 2 yue 22 ri
You Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Shen Pan Wei Yuan Hui di 1214 ci Hui Yi Tong Guo, Zi 2002 nian 4
yue 1 ri qi Shi Xing.
()(AAR)A JAf E=gZ) , 2002*20221 R AiA W J *1214
A i~i, O 2002*40 1 H Rrft ) ["Provisions on the Administration of Judicial Identifi-
cation upon Entrustment by the People's Court,", adopted on Feb. 22, 2002 at the 1,214th meeting
of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court, effective Apr. 1, 2002] Mar. 27, 2002.
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administrative liability system, most technical identifications concluded
that there had been no medical accident,74 and medical institutions were
consequently exempted from liability to a large extent. Judicial identifica-
tions proved more likely to find in favor of the patient and consequently to
allow the latter to obtain compensation.75
4. Assessment of Damages
The most important difference between administrative and tort liabil-
ity regimes lay in the assessment of compensation. For medical accidents,
assessment was under the framework established by the Regulations of
200276 though the amounts payable were stipulated by reference to local
conditions.77 Taking Beijing as an example, the maximum sum of compen-
sation payable in respect of a medical accident was approximately 100,000
RMB in 2010.78 But if the patient chose to sue the hospital on the basis of
medical fault, the compensation was calculated in accordance with the
principles ordinarily applicable to tort liability, 79 and the maximum com-
pensation payable was much higher-about 400,000 RMB in 2010. The big
differential of 300,000 RMB was mainly attributable to the award of com-
pensation for death80 that is made where the claim is brought in tort but not
where it is brought under the administrative regulations.
The medical community argued that the general approach to the as-
sessment of compensation for tortious personal injury should not apply to
medical accidents, which should be governed exclusively by the 2002 Reg-
ulations.81 However, it proved to be another story in practice, and at least
74. See Xi & Yang, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
75. See id. (reporting that judicial identifications conducted by one certified institution in
Beijing found in favor of the patient in over 60 percent of cases, as compared with less than 10
percent reported in respect of technical identifications in several areas).
76. In such cases, Section III of the SPC Notice on the Medical Accident Regulations provides
for the application of the provisions on compensation (Articles 49, 50, 51 and 52) in the 2002
Regulations themselves. SPC Notice on the Medical Accident Regulations, supra note 66, § Ill.
77. Medical Accident Regulations 2002, supra note 49, at items 2-5,7,10, 11, art. 50.
78. In 2010, the average monthly exchange rate fluctuated between approximately
$1=RMB6.6 and $1=RMB 6.8.
79. Specifically, SPC Interpretation on Compensation for Personal Injury, supra note 69, at
art. 17.
80. Id. at art. 29 (providing that compensation for death shall be payable at the rate of twen-
ty times the per capita disposable income of urban residents, or per capita net income in the case
of rural residents, at the locality of the court accepting the case (based on the previous year's
income figures)). However, if the victim is age sixty or over, the period is reduced by one year for
each year of age added; if the victim is age seventy-five or over, the period is calculated as five
years. Id.
81. Chou Yonggui (L0)(), Yi Liao Shi Gu Sun Hai Pei Chang Bu Shi Yong "Ren Shen Sun Hai
Pei Chang Si Fa Jie Shi," Zhong Hua Yi Yuan Guan Li Za Zhi 2004 nian di 12 qi, di 737-738 ye. ( "
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one local court (the Beijing Higher People's Court) provided for the top-
ping-up of compensation for medical accidents with reference to the GPCL
and any relevant judicial interpretation where the sum assessed under the
2002 Regulations left the patient under-compensated. 82 This effectively
unified the measure of compensation irrespective of the cause of action the
patient chose.
C. Effect on the Administrative Liability Regime
The increasing recourse to the ordinary principles of tortious liability
had dramatic effects on the utilization of the administrative liability regime.
Just three years after the 2002 Regulations were implemented, there were
significantly fewer applications for technical identification as both medical
institutions and patients sought to avoid the attribution of patient injury to a
medical accident: the administrative liability regime was "left in the cold"
by the parties concerned. 83 Patients turned to the GPCL because they want-
ed more compensation; hospitals, on the other hand, thought the adminis-
trative sanctions they faced under the 2002 Regulations too harsh because
they might entail, in serious cases, an order by the health administration to
suspend activities or the revocation of their practicing licenses, while the
medical workers responsible for the accident would be subject to criminal
investigation or, in less serious cases, disciplinary measures, as well as
mandatory suspension of their activities and revocation of their practicing
certificates. 84 To avoid these administrative sanctions, hospitals were often
prepared to admit civil liability voluntarily, even if this meant paying more
M737-73831. ) [Yonggui Chou, Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Some Issues
Concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury
Should Not Be Applied in Compensation for Medical Accidents, 12 Chinese Hosp. Mgmt 737, 737-
38 (2004)].
82. Bei Jing Shi Gao Ji Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Yin Fa "Bei Jing Shi Gao Ji Ren Min Fa Yuan
Guan Yu Shen Li Yi Liao Sun Hai Pei Chang Jiu Fen An Jian Ruo Gan Wen Ti de Yi Jian (Shi Xing)" de
Tong Zhi. (L ~ R z ~ II ~2~
il ( ) fJ~irl) [Notice of Beijing Higher
People's Court on Several Problems Concerning the Trial of Disputes Arising from Medical Mal-
practice (for Trial Implementation)] Jul. 13, 2005, at art. 211 ("To determine the compensation
standard for medical malpractice, provisions from Article 49 to 52 of the Regulations for the
Handling of Medical Accidents should be applied; if by following the Regulations the patient is left
uncompensated, the GPCL and any relevant judicial interpretation shall be applied to increase the
compensation.").
83. Liu Hong (iJki), "Yi Liao Shi Gu Chu Li Tiao Li" Shi Shi San nian Yuan He Bei Leng Luo,
Yi Yuan Ling Dao Jue Ce Can kao 2006 nian di 9 qi di 39-41 ye.
o ) [Hong Liu, Why are the Regulations on Handling Medical Accidents Left in the Cold Three
Years After Their Implementation, 9 Decision-Making Assistant for Hosp. Superintendents 39, 39-
41 (2006)].
84. Medical Accident Regulations 2002, supra note 49, at art. 55.
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compensation. The courts also preferred to rely on the GPCL and to deter-
mine the sum of compensation according to the general principles estab-
lished by the SPC. The 2002 Regulations thus became increasingly
marginalized.85
V. REFORM OF MEDICAL LIABILITY UNDER THE TORT LIABILITY LAW OF
2009
A. Antecedents
The dual system of liability and compensation for medical injury cre-
ated chaos in practice, at a time when pressure for reform also came from
the increasing number of disputes between doctors and patients, and wide-
spread concerns about defensive medicine.
1. Increasing Disputes between Doctors and Patients
According to a survey by the Chinese Medical Association in 2003,
among 326 medical institutions investigated, 321 (98 percent) were in-
volved in medical disputes of one type or another.86 A further survey in
2005 by the China Hospital Management Association looked at the inci-
dence of disputes in 270 hospitals. Even in high-rated (Grade 3-A) 87 hospi-
tals, there were on average over thirty lawsuits every year, and more than
one million RMB was paid as compensation in them. Doctors were assault-
ed, threatened, and abused in 73 percent of all hospitals; in 60 percent of
hospitals patients besieged and threatened hospital superintendents out of
dissatisfaction with the outcomes of their treatment; in 77 percent of hospi-
tals patients and their families refused to leave the premises or to pay their
bill after treatment; in 62 percent of hospitals patients' families laid wreaths
85. See Wang Lianggang, (1LW1), "Yi Liao Shi Gu Chu Li Tiao Li" Zai Yi Liao Jiu Fen Min
Shi Su Song Zhong de Bian Yuan Hua, Dang Dai Yi Xue 2005 nian di 10 qi, di 26 ye.
_ [Lianggang Wang, Medical Accident Regulations 2002 Marginalized in Dealing With Medical
Civil Disputes, 10 Modern Med. 26 (2005)].
86. Fan Jing & Jiang Chao ( ,ik M), Yi Liao Jiu Fen de Xian Zhuang Ji Dui Yi Yuan He Yi
Wu Ren Yuan de Ying Xiang, Zhong Guo Yi Yuan Guan Li 2003 nian di 1 qi, di 29-30 ye.
30g. ) [ing Fan & Chao Jiang, Status Quo of Medical Disputes and Their Influence on Hospitals
and Medical Personnel, 1 Mgmt. of China's Hospitals 29, 29-30 (2003)].
87. According to Articles 4 and 5 of the Administrative Rules for Hospital Grading (for Im-
plementation) (1989), hospitals are divided into ten grades (from highest to lowest): 3-Top, 3-A,
3-B, 3-C, 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, 1-A, 1-B and 1-C. Yi Liao Shi Gu Fen Ji Biao Zhun (Shi Xing), Zhong Hua Ren
Min Gong He Guo Wei Sheng Bu Ling di 32 hao. (
A l # 9) [Administrative Rules for Hospital Grading (for Trial Imple-
mentation), Ministry of Health Order No. 32] (Jul. 19, 2002), arts. 4, 5]. At the time of writing,
there are no 3-Top rated hospitals in China, so 3-A is actually the highest grade.
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and created mourning halls on the premises following the patient's death.88
Increasing numbers of these disputes resulted in litigation. Taking the
Haidian district court in Beijing as an example, eighty-nine medical dis-
putes were tried in 2003, 103 in 2004, 124 in 2005, 138 in 2006, and 160 in
2007.89
2. Concerns about Defensive Medical Treatments
The increasing number of hospital-related disputes raised concerns
that medical personnel might be induced to carry out defensive and passive
medical treatments to avoid liability, 90 though reliable empirical evidence
that this in fact occurred is lacking.
According to a questionnaire survey of 487 clinicians shortly after the
2002 Regulations were implemented, 76 percent felt psychologically pres-
sured; 42 percent said they were losing self-confidence. 91 It has also been
claimed (though without reliable supporting data) that, to avoid lawsuits
and compensation awards, medical institutions require patients as a matter
of course to undergo excessive or unnecessary examinations, and that med-
ical personnel also avoid offering or refuse to undertake risky interventions,
and instead carry out only passive treatments which, though less likely to
88. Fu Zhongyu (1W7,V Gou Jian He Xie Yi Huan Guan Xi de Dui Ce Si Kao, Yi Xue Yu She
Hui 2007 nian di 7 qi. ( (Mi3AliEAR *, #V , (( -1 2007*M73, )
[Zhongyu Fu, Thoughts on Measures That Aim at Building a Harmonious Hospital-Patient Rela-
tionship, 7 Med. & Soc'y 11, 11 (2007)]. On the role played by entrepreneurial "hospital chaos
makers," see Ding, supra note 1, at 2-3.
89. BeiJing Shi Hai Dian Qu Ren Min Fa Yuan Ke Ti Zu. ( 41),
Guan Yu Yi Liao Jiu Fen An Jian Fa Iv Shi Yong Qing Kuang de Diao Yan Bao Gao, Fa Iv Shi Yong
2008 nian di 7 qi, di 62 ye.
[Research Team of the Haidian District Court of Beijing, An Investigative Report on the Applica-
tion of the Law in Medical Disputes, 7 Legal Application 62 (2008)]. Unfortunately, there are no
reliable national estimates of the number of medical injury claims pursued in Chinese courts. It
should however be noted that the "loser pays" rule applying to court fees (but not lawyers' fees,
which are always borne by the client unless there is a contingent fee contract) acts as some disin-
centive to meritless claims.
90. Xu Ping, Wang Shuhui & Wang Yunling (4i$, T]1 * 10), Shi Lun "Yi Liao Shi
Gu Chu Li Tiao Li" Yu Yi Sheng de Zi Wei Yi Xue Xing Wei, Zhong Guo Yi Xue Lun Li Xue 2006 nian
di 1 qi, di 59 ye. (
No ) [Ping Xu, Shuhui Wang & Yunling Wang, On the Relationship between Medical Accident
Regulations 2002 and Defensive Medical Treatment by Medical Personnel, 1 Ethics in Med. 59, 59
(2006)].
91. Qin Hong, Zou Xiaoping & Yang Hui (kl, V 9 '. ), "Yi Liao Shi Gu Chu Li Tiao
Li" Dui Si Bai Ba Shi Qi Ming Lin Chuang Yi Sheng Xin Li Zhuang Kuang de Ying Xiang Ji Dui Ce,
Zhong Guo Quan Ke Yi Xue 2004 nian di 7 qi, di 475 ye.
7V, M475no ) [Hong Qin, Xiaoping Zou & Hui Yang, The Influence of the Medical Accident
Regulations 2002 on 487 Clinicians' Psychology and Countermeasures Against It, 7 China Gen.
Med. 475, 475 (2004)].
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lead to iatrogenic injury, may not be in the patient's best interests. 92 Such
attitudes may also have affected medical education and training. In 2002, in
another questionnaire about the new Regulations' influence in this area, 35
percent of respondents said that they were unwilling to supervise interns,
and 59 percent said that they were reluctant to instruct students in how to
operate. 93
3. The Chaos Resulting from the Dual Dystem of Medical Liability94
The emergence of the dual liability system for medical malpractice
can be attributed to three basic factors: first, the health administration's
excessive emphasis on the uniqueness of medical institutions and its deter-
mination to give special protection to them; second, patients were forced to
seek a more favorable compensation system to overcome the limits pre-
scribed in the Regulations; and third, the court system tolerated a situation
in which medical accident and medical fault were alternative causes of
action, and even went so far as to create parallel systems for "identifica-
tion" and the assessment of compensation. The disadvantages of such a
state of affairs are obvious. The creation of a dual system under which lim-
its on liability under the administrative regulations could easily be circum-
vented by recourse to the more favorable rules (so far as the patient was
concerned) of ordinary tortious liability aggravated disputes between doc-
tors and patients. Defensive and passive medical treatment-to the extent
(if any) that it stemmed from the increased liabilities-harmed the interests
of all patients, who could be obliged to pay for unnecessary examinations
while at the same time being denied treatments which, though risky, were
in their best interests. Lastly the disunity of judicial approaches harmed the
authority of justice itself. This chaotic state of affairs was calling out for
further reform by the time of the Tort Liability Law (TLL) of 2009.95
92. See also the evidence of a number of other local surveys cited by Xi and Yang, supra note
1, at 71-72.
93. Qin, Zou & Yang, supra note 91.
94. Yang Lixin (4A AV), Zhong Guo Yi Liao Sun Hai Ze Ren Zhi du Gai Ge, Fa Xue Yan Jiu
2009 nian di 4 qi, di 84-85 ye.( ( ffERJ , ((M'9415 200914%4)v), M84-85wo ) [Lixing Yang,
Reform of the Liability System Relating to Medical Harm in China, 4 Chinese J. Law, 84-85
(2009)].
95. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Qin Quan Ze Ren Fa ( ((19 AfXtWfky iIV))
[promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010]
[P.R.C. Presidential Decree], available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-
12/26/content_1497435.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter TLL]. For analysis in English,
see Helmut Koziol & Yan Zhu, Background and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liability
Law, 1 J. Eur. Tort L. 328 (2010); Surya Deva, The PRC Tort Law: A Big Step Forward, 2 City U. H.K.
L. Rev. 383 (2010).
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B. Legislative History
The TLL was the outcome of a long history of unsuccessful attempts
at codification in P.R. China. Following previous failed attempts to intro-
duce a Civil Code, it was decided to proceed incrementally by way of a
series of enactments dealing with particular areas of civil law.96 The first
draft of the TLL was actually the title on tort liability (Title VIII) in a new
draft Civil Code of 2002.97 This made no specific provision for medical
liability. It was in the second draft of December 21, 2008, that a new chap-
ter on Liability for Injury in Medical Treatment was added, reflecting the
legislature's conclusion that a specific provision was necessary in view of
the chaos that had arisen in practice. Apart from one significant amendment
(relating to the burden of proof), 98 this was the regime introduced in the
final version of the Law adopted on December 26, 2009.
The TLL had three basic goals in reforming the medical liability sys-
tem: (1) to establish a single cause of action for medical malpractice to
unify the application of law; (2) to seek a balance between the interests of
the patient and the medical institution; and (3) to promote the sound devel-
opment of state-funded medical services (Medicare). 99 Its approach may be
evaluated by reference to the four basic elements which we have highlight-
ed with respect to the preexisting liability regimes: namely, the basis of the
cause of action, the burden of proof, the identification process, and the
assessment of damages.
C. Four Dimensions of the TLL
1. Basis of the Cause of Action
The TLL adopts the term "liability for injury in medical treatment" to
denote the field of its application. The language can be traced back to a
Regulation issued by the Supreme People's Court in 2008, which used the
96. The legislature of P.R. China attempted to introduce a Civil Code on three previous occa-
sions (1954-1958, 1962-1966 and 1979-1982), but failed each time-for primarily political
reasons. The first effort was halted by the Great Leap Forward and Movement of People's Com-
mune in 1958, the second was halted by the Great Cultural Revolution begun in 1966, and the
third was delayed because of the political belief that a civil code would be premature with eco-
nomic reform underway. See Gu angran (TIAM) , Xin Zhong Guo Min Shi Li Fa Gai Shu, Fa Iv
Chu Ban She 2000 nian Ban, di 1-3,9 ye.
(T[lV1,ft Ig±2000-Fl, $1-3, 9io. ) [Angran Gu, A Brief Intro-
duction to the Civil Law Legislation of the New China 1-3, 9 (2000)].
97. George W. Conk, Translation: A New Tort Code Emerges in China: An Introduction to the
Discussion with a Translation of Chapter 8-Tort Liability, of the Official Discussion Draft of the
Proposed Revised Civil Code of the People's Republic of China, 30 Fordham Int'l L.J. 935 (2007).
98. See infra Part V.C.2.
99. Yang, supra note 94, at 84-85.
2012] 43
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
phrase "dispute relating to compensation for injury in medical treat-
ment."100 The term "medical accident" was deliberately avoided because of
its use under the administrative liability regime.10' The aim was to mark a
clear break between the TLL and the 2002 Regulations in the area of medi-
cal liability. The 2002 Regulations are still binding on the health admin-
istration in its adjudications on administrative liability, but the courts are no
longer bound by them.
The relevant chapter of the TLL begins with a general statement of the
responsibility of the medical institution both for its own fault and for that of
its medical staff. Article 54 of the TLL provides: "If a patient suffers injury
in the course of medical diagnosis or treatment, and the medical institution
or medical personnel are at fault, the medical institution shall bear compen-
satory liability."
This umbrella clause subsumes two specific liabilities for medical
fault that the Law goes on to specify, dealing respectively with the breach
of medical ethical duties and the breach of medical technical duties. As the
provision makes clear, the medical institution's liability in each case may
be either personal (i.e., for its own fault) or vicarious.102 Additionally, the
same chapter of the TLL specifies a separate strict liability for the medical
institution as the supplier of medical products. In all, then, the TLL pro-
vides for three basic types of liability for injury resulting from medical
treatment, and these are now addressed in more detail in the sections be-
low. 103
100. "Min Shi An Jian An You Gui Ding", 2007 nian 10 yue 29 ri You Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan
Shen Pan Wei Yuan Hui di 1438 ci Hui Yi Tao Lun Tong Guo, Zi 2008 nian 4 yue 1 ri qi Shi Xing.
( (*Et-R Z),2007*100 29 H hJ A 143 8 K= WiiB,
0 2008*4A 1 H 99fiT) [Regulation on Causes of Action in Civil Cases, promulgated by the
Judicial Committee of the SPC on Oct. 29, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008]. Following amendment by
the SPC on February 18, 2011, Section 351 of the Regulation now treats a dispute relating to
compensation for injury in medical treatment as a "tort liability dispute", with specific recognition
of both "disputes relating to liability for infringement of a patient's right to be informed and to
consent" and "disputes relating to liability for medical products." Both discussed further infra
Parts V.C.1.a, V.C.1.c.
101. Ai Erken( iS ), Lun Yi Liao Sun Hai, Bei Fang Fa Xue 2008 nian di er qi, di 49 ye.
( i FtyN ' ,(I ' 2008*#2 1, M49W. ) [Erken Ai, On Medical Malpractice, 2
N. Legal Sci.46, 49 (2008)].
102. There is therefore no need to rely on the general provision on vicarious liability in Article
34 of the TLL. On the medical institution's liability under the TLL for organizational fault, see Gert
BrUggemeier, European Civil Liability Law Outside Europe. The Example of the Big Three: China,
Brazil, Russia, 2 J. Eur. Tort L. 1, 7-8 (2011).
103. Yang, supra note 94, at 89.
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a. Liability for Breaching Medical Ethical Duties
The first form of medical fault addressed in the TLL is the breach of
medical ethical duties. In effect, this recognizes a liability for injury result-
ing from the failure to obtain informed consent to treatment. Article 55(1)
of the TLL establishes the medical ethical duties in the following terms:
In the course of diagnosis and medical treatment, medical personnel shall
give the patient an explanation of the nature of his illness and the medi-
cal measures proposed. If surgery, special examination, or special thera-
py needs to be carried out, the medical personnel shall give the patient a
timely explanation of the medical treatment risks, alternative medical
treatment plans, and other relevant considerations, and get his written
permission. If it is not appropriate to give the explanation to the patient,
the medical personnel shall give the explanation to the close relatives of
the patient and get their written permission. 104
The second paragraph of Article 55 of the TLL provides for liability
for breach of the specified duties: "[i]f the medical personnel fail to fulfill
the duties in the preceding paragraph, and cause injury to the patient, their
medical institution shall bear compensatory liability." It may be noted that
the liability is for "injury," and not merely the violation of the patient's
civil rights or interests, and that there appears therefore to be no right to
compensation for infringement of the patient's autonomy or dignity in the
absence of physical harm or serious emotional harm.105
b. Liability for Breaching Medical Technical Duties
Article 57 of the TLL is about liability for breaching medical technical
duties: "[i]f, in the course of diagnosis or medical treatment, medical per-
sonnel fail to fulfill the duty of diagnosis and medical treatment corre-
sponding to the state of medical treatment then and there, and cause injury
to the patient, their medical institution shall bear compensatory liability."
As the content of the applicable standard of care ("the duty of diagnosis
and medical treatment corresponding to the state of medical treatment then
and there," i.e., at the time and place the treatment was given) is not speci-
104. There is an exception to the above-mentioned information duties in Article 56 when it is
impossible to seek the consent of the patient or his or her close relatives: "If, due to an emergency
such as saving a patient on the verge of death, it is impossible to seek the consent of the patient or
his close relatives, appropriate medical measures can be taken immediately upon approval by the
principal of the medical institution or any authorized person." It should be emphasized that there
is no duty on the principal of the medical institution or any authorized person to approve emer-
gency medical measures. So this exception is just a privilege and does not entail a duty to act.
105. See also Wang Zhu (E177) , Jie Shi Lun Shi Ye Xia de Qin Hai Huan Zhe Zhi Qing Tong Yi
Quan Qin Quan Ze Ren, Fa Xue 2011 nian di 12 qi ji jiang fabiao.
Wang, Tort Liability for Infringement on the Right of Informed Consent of Patients under the
Framework of Heurematic Law, 12 Legal Sci. - (forthcoming 2011, 12th Issue)].
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fled in the TLL or in other legislation, it becomes a further question for the
courts to decide.
c. Liability for Medical Products
The third type of medical liability covered by the TLL is with respect
to injuries caused by medical products. Here the liability is strict rather than
fault-based-even so far as the medical institution is concerned. However,
where the patient claims compensation from the medical institution rather
than the manufacturer of the product-or, as the case may be, a supplier of
blood for transfusion-it has the right to indemnity from the liable manu-
facturer or supplier of blood. The reason for what (in international perspec-
tive) is a rather unusual strict liability on the medical institution as supplier
is the special role played by hospitals in China as suppliers of pharmaceuti-
cal products. It is commonly recognized that Chinese hospitals derive a
significant proportion of their income from the sale of drugs, and indeed
that they profit from excessive and unnecessary sales. This is quite differ-
ent from the situation in other countries. In fact, drug sales make up about
50 percent of the revenues of most hospitals in China. Taking Shanghai as
an example, the total revenue of state-owned hospitals in 2007 was 39 bil-
lion RMB, which consisted of: (1) government subsidy of 3.64 billion
RMB (9.5%); (2) income from the provision of medical services amounting
to 16.94 billion RMB (43%); (3) drug sales amounting to 17.51 billion
RMB (45%); and (4) income from other sources of 950 million RMB
(2.5%).106 The percentage of drug sales in the revenues of private hospitals
is even higher than that in state-owned hospitals. Overall, the hospital sys-
tem is the major outlet for the sale of medicines in China. In Shanghai,
from 2002 to 2007, hospitals accounted for 79 percent of the drug market,
compared with 21 percent comprised by drugstores.107 In 2009, the market
for medicines in China as a whole was 580 billion RMB, of which hospitals
accounted for 430 billion RMB (74%) and drugstores only 150 billion
RMB (26%).os Driven by mutual financial interest with the drug compa-
nies, hospitals have become the only sellers of some drugs in China.
106. Wang Shiling(Itlt), Hu Gong Li Yi Yuan Shou Zhi Bao Gao Chu Lu Zhi Xing Yao Pin
Ling Cha Jia Que Kou San Shi Yi, 21 Shi Ji Jing Ji Bao Dao 2010 nian 4 yue 14 ri.
((L; 3iZ, (( 1~~ 2010*4A~1481
o ) [Shiling Wang, Financial Reports of Public Hospitals in Shanghai: 3 Billion Yuan Government
Subsidy Needed to Cover Deficit, 21st Century Rep. (Apr. 14, 2010)], available at
http://health.sohu.com/20100414/n271494256.shtml (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
107. Id.
108. Shi Chang Gui Mo Zhan Bi Bai Fen Zhi Qi Shi Si Yi Yuan Reng Wei Yao Pin Xiao Shou Zhu
Qu Dao, Di Yi Cai Jing Ri Bao 2010 nian 8 yue 30 ri. ( 017%MM~ft74%
IRUHA (f-ft91 , 201058 30H. ) (Taking up 74% of the
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Article 59 of the TLL accordingly provides for medical institutions to
bear liability for defective pharmaceutical products:
If a defect in a drug, sterilizing agent or medical device, or a substandard
blood transfusion, causes injury to a patient, the patient may claim com-
pensation from the manufacturer or the blood supplying institution, or
may claim compensation from the medical institution. If the patient
claims compensation from the medical institution, after the medical insti-
tution has paid the compensation, it has the right to claim indemnity
from the liable manufacturer or blood supplying institution.
2. Burden of Proof
The new law does not explicitly deal with proof of causation, 109 but
makes significant changes in the principles applicable to the proof of fault.
The burden of proving fault, or (as the case may be) the absence of fault, on
the part of the medical institution is no longer on the hospital or doctor (as
it was under the SPC Stipulations on Evidence in Civil Litigation)110 but
primarily on the patient. According to the new law, if a patient suffers inju-
ry in the course of diagnosis or medical treatment, and the medical institu-
tion or its medical personnel are at fault, the medical institution shall bear
compensatory liability."' On the other hand, fault on the part of the medi-
cal institution is presumed in special circumstances. If a patient is injured,
and any of the following circumstances apply, fault on the part of the medi-
cal institution is taken to be established unless the medical institution
proves the contrary: (1) violation of provisions of laws, administrative reg-
ulations, ministerial rules, or other standards regarding diagnosis and medi-
cal treatment; (2) concealing or refusing to provide medical record
materials related to the dispute; and (3) falsifying, distorting, or destroying
medical record materialS.112
Market, Hospitals are still the Main Channel for the Sale of Drugs, First Financial Daily (Aug. 30,
2010)], available at http://money.163.com/10/0830/01/6FA2PBLC00254TK.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2011).
109. The concept of cause is left undefined in the TLL, but specific provision is made for cases
of causal uncertainty as between alternative defendants (Article 10) and multiple sufficient causal
contributions (Article 11). TLL, supra note 95. The TLL gives no indication whether the basic
notion of cause embraces legal as well as factual causation, nor as to how the line is to be drawn
between consequences attributable to the tort and those which are too remote or outside the
scope of the risk attributable to the defendant. Chinese scholarship has not yet given significant
consideration to the recognition of liability for loss of chance as a means of circumventing difficul-
ties of proof. See also Ken Oliphant, Uncertain Causes: the Chinese Tort Liability Act in Compara-
tive Perspective, in Towards A Chinese Civil Code: Historical and Comparative Perspective (Chen
Lei & C.H. van Rhee eds., forthcoming 2011 or 2012).
110. Several Stipulations of Supreme People's Court on Evidence in Civil Litigation, supra note
70, at art. 4(8); see also supra Part V.B.2.




In fact, this provision is a significantly watered-down version of what
was proposed when the reform of tort law was revived in 2008 with the
publication of a second draft of the Tort Liability Law (building on the first
draft included in the proposal for a Civil Code of 2002). The second draft
included a reversal of the burden of proof by which, if a patient's injury
appeared to be caused by a diagnosis or medical treatment by medical per-
sonnel, a causal relationship between such diagnosis or treatment and the
harm suffered by the patient would be presumed unless the medical per-
sonnel provided proof to the contrary.11 3 This provision was deleted in the
third draft of November 6, 2009114 and does not appear in the TLL as en-
acted. This may be understood as the implicit rejection of presumed causa-
tion in the area of medical malpractice. So far as patients are concerned, the
new law thus marks a step backwards not only from the presumption of
both fault and causation under the approach previously adopted by the
SPC, but also (insofar as proof of causation is concerned) from the second
draft of 2008.
3. The Identification Procedure
Unfortunately, the TLL does not resolve the controversial question of
who should act as the organizer of the identification process it requires.
However, just one day before the TLL was to enter into force, the SPC
issued a Notice Addressing Several Issues Relating to the Application of
the Tort Liability Lawl 15 according to Article 3 of which a people's court
applying the TLL in a case where technical identification is required shall
itself take responsibility for organizing the process.116 In other words, there
should be a judicial identification, not an identification by a committee
appointed by the health administration.
4. Assessment of Damages
There is no special provision in the TLL dealing with compensation
for injury arising from medical treatment. Consequently, the general ap-
proach applicable to compensation for tortious personal injury, found in
113. See Tort Liability Law of P. R. China (second officially discussed edition/Dec. 21, 2008),
translated by Zhu Wang and George W. Conk, unpublished [hereinafter Tort Liability Law, second
draft Dec. 2008].
114. See Tort Liability Law of P. R. China (third officially discussed edition/Nov. 6, 2009),
available at official website of NPC: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2009-
11/06/content-1525914.htm.
115. Notice of Supreme People's Court Addressing Several Issues Relating to the Application
of the Tort Liability Law of P. R. China, (promulgated by the SPC, June 30, 2010). (A "Notice" is an
informal but binding direction by the SPC to the lower courts.)
116. Id. at§ III.
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Articles 16 to 23 of the Law, is to be followed. Article 16 of the TLL pro-
vides: 117
One who infringes on the rights or interests of another, and causes physi-
cal injury, shall compensate for the reasonable expenses of medical care,
nursing, and transportation, etc., for the purposes of therapy and restor-
ing good health, as well as for reduced income due to loss of working
time. One who causes disability shall also pay for the cost of prostheses
and compensation for disability. One who causes death shall also pay fu-
neral expenses and death benefits. 118
The succeeding Articles of the TLL deal (inter alia) with compensa-
tion on death (Article 18) and compensation for serious emotional damage
(Article 22).119
VI. ANOTHER STEP BACKWARDS ON ITS WAY?
The reform of tort liability for medical malpractice in China is still a
work in progress, and it seems certain that there will be further reform,
whether by incorporation of the rules of tortious liability for medical mal-
practice in a Civil Code, or a specific enactment on medical treatment or
medical malpractice,120 or by a comprehensive SPC interpretation that
directly addresses all unresolved questions. Whether the direction of such
reform will be "forwards" or "backwards" remains to be seen, but our in-
clination is to think that it will be the latter, if only because the TLL fails to
resolve a number of disputed issues related to the four dimensions high-
lighted for analysis in this paper and, by default, seems to validate solutions
favoring the medical community's interests over those of patients. We now
briefly address each of the four in turn, highlighting possible options for
further reform.
First, in considering the basis of the cause of action, it seems likely
that clarification will be required of the standard of care to which doctors
are held in performing their technical duties. The "then and there" 121 medi-
117. Id.at§4.
118. TLL, supra note 95, at art. 16.
119. On the damages that may be awarded under the TLL, see Koziol & Zhu,supra note 95, at
343-344.
120. Ai Erken & Fang Bo(iVF's, br4), Wo Guo Yi Liao Sun Hai Pei Chang An Jian Fa Iv Shi
Yong Wen Ti Yan Jiu Bao Gao, He Bei Fa Xue 2010 nian di 2 qi, di 130-131 ye.
( ,(Tj) 20102l, M130-131
3o ) [Erken Ai & Bo Fang, The Research Report Concerning the Application of Law for the Medi-
cal Malpractice Compensation Cases of China, 2 Hebei L. Sci. 121, 130-131 (2010)].
121. See TLL, supra note 95, at art. 57; supra Part IV.C.1.b. In their translation of the TLL, Yan
Zhu and Helmut Koziol use the expression "at the time," which is the direct translation of the
Chinese word. Yan Zhu & Helmut Koziol, Tort Liability Law of the People's Republic of China, 1 J.
Eur. Tort. L. 362, 370 (Yan Zhu & Helmut Koziol trans., 2010). But in Chinese, "at the time", usual-
ly refers to a given place as well as a given time. The standard is therefore to be understood as
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cal standard adopted as the criterion to judge medical misconduct is argua-
bly too imprecise, and should be supplemented with reference to specific
factors. In fact, the second draft of the TLL contained a provision (deleted
in the final version) which expressly required the court to consider the loca-
tion of the medical institution, its accreditation, and the qualifications of its
medical personnel.1 22 An almost identical provision has now found its way
into guidance issued to the local courts in Beijing by the city's Higher Peo-
ple's Court. 123 In a country so large and with such substantial differences in
healthcare delivery between different areas-especially between urban and
rural areas-it is easy to see that such a provision might be considered
desirable. However, insofar as it rubber-stamps local practice even if it fails
to attain reasonable quality standards, such reform could well be seen as
contrary to the interests of patients. Another possible reform adverse to
such interests would be the introduction of limits on the liability of medical
institutions for defective pharmaceutical products. Arguably, it is unfair to
treat medical institutions as sellers (and, as such, strictly liable for defects)
in cases of all types. At the least, since blood suppliers in China are non-
profit institutions who act in the public interest, there seems to be a case for
introducing a cap on their liability in damages. From the patient's perspec-
tive, the best that could be said for such a reform is that it would serve to
ensure the continued supply of blood for transfusion in the interests of all
patients.
Secondly, regarding the burden of proof, the major open question is
proof of causation. Under the pre-TLL approach of the SPC, the burden of
proving the absence of a causal relationship between the medical treatment
and the patient's injury, as well as the absence of medical fault, fell on the
hospital.124 The TLL puts the burden of proving fault on the patient in most
cases-though Article 59 prescribes a set (albeit limited) of factors whose
presence raises a presumption of fault-but it does not deal explicitly with
the burden of causation, which is not unimportant in medical cases. It
seems likely that, in the absence of a specific provision in the TLL, the
referring to local practice, and does not mean (for example) imposing the standards of the big
cities on practitioners in remote rural localities.
122. See Tort Liability Law, second draft Dec. 2008, supra note 113.
123. Bei Jing Shi Gao Ji Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Yin Fa "Bei Jing Shi Gao Ji Ren Min Fa Yuan
Guan Yu Shen Li Yi Liao Sun Hai Pei Chang Jiu Fen An Jian Ruo Gan Wen Ti de Zhi Dao Yi Jian Shi
Xing".
Ofl A (is) ) ) [Guiding Notice of Beijing Higher People's Court on Several Problems
Concerning the Trial of Disputes Arising from Medical Malpractice (for Trial Implementation)](promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of Beijing Higher People's Court, Nov. 18, 2010).
124. Several Stipulations of the SPC on Evidence in Civil Actions, supra note 70, at art. 4(8).
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burden of proving causation will follow the ordinary rule, and therefore fall
on the plaintiff. It is arguable, however, that a more nuanced approach is
necessary to balance the interests of the competing parties, and in particular
to make allowance for the information and resource asymmetry that very
often obstructs proof of causation. We therefore take the liberty of suggest-
ing that Chinese law should follow the German approach of shifting the
burden of proving causation to the hospital in cases of gross negligence in
medical treatment. 125 The serious character of the treatment error provides
a reason for moving the risk of causal uncertainty from the patient to the
hospital.
Thirdly, we come to the identification process, which is likely to be
the most important practical problem relating to medical malpractice suits
to arise in the immediate future.126 As patients do not trust technical identi-
fications conducted by the health administration, and hospitals do not trust
judicial identifications, scholars have suggested the adoption of a combined
system.127 Judicial identification under the charge of a specified person
would be maintained and carried out in a different jurisdiction from that in
which the injury occurred in order to avoid any conflict of interest on the
part of the local medical association, and any perception that it might be
deliberately protecting its members. At the same time, technical identifica-
tion would be conducted by clinical professionals together with medico-
legal experts to guarantee an objective and just identification result. Alt-
hough such a process involves a duplication of resources, the hope is that it
would ultimately command more respect-at least in cases where the two
processes come to the same result.
Turning lastly to the assessment of compensation, the principal ques-
tion awaiting resolution is whether the general approach adopted in the
TLL with respect to personal injury leaves room for special rules in the
area of medical malpractice. It is quite conceivable that pressure could
mount to enact rules limiting the damages recoverable in tort by reference
to existing provisions of the Medical Accident Regulations, for example,
125. See Marc Stauch, The Law of Medical Negligence in England and Germany: A Compara-
tive Analysis 87-92 (2008).
126. Wang Cheng(ffh) , Yi Liao Qin Quan Xing Wei Fa Iv Gui Zhi de Shi Zheng Fen Xi-Jian
Ping "Qin Quan Ze Ren Fa" Di Qi Zhang, Zhong Guo Fa Xue 2010 nian di 5 qi, di 116-118 ye.
AiW ((MRfRA) M , ( l 2010*M5, M116-118 o ) [Cheng Wang,
Analysis of Legal Regulation of Medical Tort and Evaluation of Chapter Seven of Tort Law, 5 China
L. 113, 116-18 (2010)].
127. Ai Erken & Fang Bo(3,S bfi1), Lun Yi Liao Sun Hai Jian Ding Zhi Du, Shi Dai Fa Xue
2009 nian di 5 qi, di 25 ye. ( ( , ((fftM)) 2009M55V1, M25 o )
[Erken Ai & Bo Fang, Discussion of the Appraisement System of Medical Malpractice, 5 Presentday
L. Sci. 20, 25-26 (2009)].
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the apportionment of liability by reference to the respective roles played by
the medical fault and the patient's preexisting condition. 128 As a cap cur-
rently applies to compensation for emotional harm in medical malpractice
claims brought under the administrative liability regime,129 this too could
conceivably be adopted for the purposes of liability in tort, if it is consid-
ered useful to limit the liability of medical institutions. Neither of these
possible reforms would be in the interests of patients.
CONCLUSION
P.R. China faces numerous healthcare challenges in the coming years
as it strives to develop an equitable system of universal health care for its
citizens. Relative to the magnitude of that task, the development of appro-
priate mechanisms to provide compensation and accountability with respect
to medical injuries is a rather small matter. Yet it is not unimportant. The
popular unrest provoked by the perceived unfairness of the liability system
in the early years of the present century sat ill with the commitment to "so-
cial harmony and stability" that is proclaimed in the opening Article of the
new Tort Liability Law.130 It is still too early to assess, however, whether
the steps taken forwards and backwards, to the left and to the right, as the
"dance pattern" of the reform process has slowly unfolded, have adequately
balanced the rights and interests of the dancing partners, or to predict what
new steps they will be required to learn in the future.
128. See infra Part Ill.B.2.d.
129. Id.
130. TLL, supra note 95, at art. 1.
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